This note analyses a peculiar feature of the ESM, namely the lack of an acceptable set of standards for the fundamental democratic principle of transparency. Moving from the particular nature of this mechanism, we will highlight the most critical concerns connected to secrecy, confidentiality and inviolability of documents, looking not only at the ESM Treaty but also at relevant documents approved by its bodies (in particular the Code of Conduct and the By-Laws).
agencies shall work as openly as possible. As Mendes has pointed out, such provisions introduced a general principle of participation in decision-making processes that was explicitly raised as a pillar of EU democracy (Mendes 2011 (Mendes : 1875 . Several concerns about the interpretation of these Treaties' rules remain, as some commentators have shown (Mendes 2011), but there is undoubtedly an increasing emphasis specifically on transparency in the EU legal order. This is confirmed by the provision of the right to access to documents in Article 42 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, according to which " [a] ny citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in a Member State, has a right of access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents".
The recent economic crisis, however, has put this important principle's fulfilment at stake within the Eurozone, as intergovernmental solutions to the crisis have been characterized by a "closed doors" approach (Hinarejos 2015: 26) . The Euro-area Member
States signed international treaties in order to strengthen the EU fiscal rules on public deficit and public debt (e.g. the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union -TSCG) and grant assistance to States in conditions of severe financial instability (by the "rescue funds", namely the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) I ). The EU's emphasis on transparency, in particular, does not find an adequate equivalent within the construction of the ESM, the well-known permanent intergovernmental anti-crisis mechanism formally set outside EU law. Several legal scholars have cast some light on many critical features of this mechanism. First, although it is not part of EU law, it is surely part of the economic governance of the Eurozone, and it could threaten the constitutional balance within the Another sign of the ESM's questionable construction, as we will argue, is how it harms the principle of transparency. This aspect seems alarming, as there is an intimate connection between transparency and the basic principle of democratic control of public expenditures and budget policy. The risk of opacity within the ESM could represent a step back from the increasing importance that EU law attaches to transparency.
After a brief description of the nature of the ESM, the paper will give an overview of the main problems the mechanism has with the fulfilment of the principle of transparency.
Both the German Federal Constitutional Court and the Finnish Constitutional Law
Committee have underlined the ESM's potential opacity, as we will describe in order to highlight the crucial role of transparency for parliamentary control. Subsequently, the ESM has imposed upon itself several disclosure rules, which still appear soft and barely effective in allowing the widespread transmission of ESM's activities to civil society. After analysing these rules, the paper will sketch possible solutions at the EU and national levels.
The nature of the ESM and its lack of transparency
The ESM, as defined by its establishing Treaty (hereinafter referred to as ESMT), is an The ESMT, quite apart from lacking any particular transparency obligations, also contains rules on confidential documents, immunity and inviolability. According to Article 34 ESMT, the main bodies, namely the Board of Governors (whose members are the financial ministers of the Euro-area States), the Board of Directors, the Managing Director, and any other person who works in connection with the ESM, "shall not disclose information that is subject to professional secret". As highlighted by Tuori and Tuori In addition, the ESM is substantively a public agency with an ambitious constitutional program and, specifically, with the reputation of being "a collective insurance device against future damages that could affect a country or a people" (Napolitano 2012b: 45). X It is true that the ESM acts within the financial market, so secrecy and confidentiality can be essential in certain circumstances, but public bodies that have this kind of impact on welfare policy should adhere to minimum standards of political accountability and transparency.
These concerns about opacity stand in stark contrast with the aforementioned emphasis on transparency in the EU Treaties.
The ESM before the Finnish Constitutional Law Committee and the German Federal Constitutional Court: aspects related to parliamentary control
The ESM's opacity has not gone unnoticed by some national Constitutional Courts and Committees (specifically German and Finnish), which have underlined critical issues regarding its lack of transparency and highlighted the inevitable necessity of some forms of 
Soft rules of disclosure in the ESM Code of Conduct and in the ByLaws
During 2014, the ESM adopted two important documents: These lacunae notwithstanding, this Code does take into account the will of parliaments to obtain as much information as possible, and providing comprehensive knowledge seems to prevail over confidentiality and secrecy duties. However, there are no specific procedures aimed at enforcing this power, which could render the Code ineffective; it is, above all, voluntarily adopted (the ESMT does not contain any indications about it) and can be reviewed by the Board of Directors (the executive body).
Article 11 of the Code must comply with Article 17 of the ESM By-Laws, which states specific rules for the disclosure of documents (Article 11(1) and (3), ESM Code of Conduct).
Article 17 of the ESM By-Laws, in turn, contains numerous provisions on document disclosure, which actually seem very soft. There is no mention of the "comprehensive information" that the ESM must give to national parliaments; the only duties that the Board of Governors has imposed on itself are to refer requests for information or documents by national parliaments to the government of the relevant ESM Member XXI and to publish an annual report on the main activities of the ESM on its official website.
XXII
Instead, the most important documents of the ESM may, not must, be communicated to ESM Members, the EC, the ECB, and the IMF. XXIII These documents may also be disclosed to other parties, but only at the discretion of the Managing Director. XXIV In any case, the Board of Governors has the power to derogate from these rules "when necessary or appropriate for an overriding public interest or to effect the intent and purpose of the Treaty". XXV Moreover, in several cases, the ESM By-Laws impose the duty not to communicate or disclose confidential information, in particular internal information. 
Final remarks
After these brief notes, we can easily argue that, in the ESM governance, confidentiality and secrecy are the rule and transparency and disclosure the exception. This could be tolerable in a private company or even in international organizations in general, but it is problematic in international institutions that have an impact on welfare policy, and has prompted concerns regarding the protection of human rights (Salomon 2015; Schwarz 2014). The ESM's function means that it has to act in financial markets with a certain degree of discretion, but it should have higher standards of transparency because of its great influence on domestic economic and social policy.
One of the most critical points concerns the aforementioned safeguard clause regarding document disclosure, as stated by Article 17 (13) As Norberto Bobbio wrote, a democracy should be, at least in a perfect world, a government of public power in public (Bobbio 1980: 182 Bogdandy and Ioannidis (2014: 94) . V According to ECB, the ESM does not act as a fiscal transfer "but only as a liquidity bridge that allows euro area countries in distress to 'buy time' to take the necessary measures to restore fiscal sustainability and competitiveness in the medium term" (ECB, Monthly Bulletin, "The European Stability Mechanism", June 2011 
